HRAFN ASGEIRSSON
University of Southern California, USA
asgeirss[at]usc[dot]edu
TITLE: Vagueness, Comparative Value, and the “Lawmakers’ Challenge”
ABSTRACT: In “The Value of Vagueness,” Timothy Endicott argues that vague law can be better than precise law. I think he is correct in many respects, but will suggest that we modify and supplement his framework in order to get a firmer grip on what I call the Lawmakers’ Challenge: the scenario in which lawmakers find themselves when they must determine whether the consequences of precision are worse than the consequences of vagueness. This will allow us to identify several points of actual and possible disagreement, each of which could affect Endicott’s claim that vagueness in fact has comparative value. I also hope to provide a framework within which we can compare positions that seem – on the face of it – hard to compare, due to the fact that they rest on different theories of value and/or different theories of law.
WILLIAM ROCHE
Texas Christian University, USA
w.roche[at]tcu[dot]edu
TITLE: Probabilistic coherence with inconsistency
ABSTRACT: I develop a probabilistic account of coherence, and argue that at least in certain respects it is preferable to the probabilistic accounts developed by Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs (2007), Branden Fitelson (2003), Erik Olsson (2005), and Tomoji Shogenji (1999). The account I develop, like the account developed by Douven and Meijs, and the account developed by Fitelson, allows for coherent but inconsistent sets of claims. So I close by relating the account to an important, but little discussed, problem for coherentist theories of justification, viz., the “Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.”
MARCELLO GUARINI
University of Windsor, Canada
mguarini[at]uwindsor.ca
TITLE: Case Classification and the Spaces of Reasons
ABSTRACT: A simple recurrent artificial neural network (ANN) is used to classify situations as permissible or impermissible. The trained ANN can be understood as having set up a similarity space of cases at the level of its internal or hidden units. An analysis of the network’s internal representations is undertaken using a new visualization technique for state space approaches to understanding similarity. Insights from the literature on moral philosophy pertaining to contributory standards will be used to interpret the state space set up by the ANN as being structured by implicit reasons. The ANN on its own is not capable of explicitly representing or offering reasons to itself or others. That said, the low level similarity space set up by the network could be made available to higher order processes that exploit it for case-based reasoning. It will be argued that
for normative purposes, similarity could be seen as a contributor to procedural coherence and local substantive coherence, but not to global forms of coherence given the computational complexity of managing those more ambitious forms of coherence.
KENNETH EHRENBERG
University at Buffalo, USA
kenneth[at]buffalo[dot]edu
TITLE: Pattern Languages & Institutional Facts: Functions & Coherence in Law
ABSTRACT: I explore the notion of Pattern Languages, originally developed by architect Christopher Alexander and embraced in Object-Oriented computer programming, as a model of coherence for use in conjunction with an understanding of law informed by John Searle’s theory of institutional facts. Under Searle’s theory, the law can be understood both as an institution itself governed by foundational documents and practices, and as a method for creating new institutions through the codification of the assignment of functions, usually of the form “X counts as Y in circumstances C.” Pattern Languages, which are schematic templates for problem-solving, can then be developed within a legal system as a coherence constraint on the assignment of functions such that codified legal solutions do not conflict with other legal solutions to related or distinct problems. If it is possible to reduce legal enactments to such a schema, the likely result will be a greater ease of the representation of legal rules by computer systems, while the pattern language encourages progress toward an ideal of coherence.
JAROMIR SAVELKA
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
jaromir.savelka[at]law[dot]mail[dot]com
TITLE: Using coherence computation to assess complexity of legal problems as algorithms
ABSTRACT: Legal profession is in its nature a problem solving business that can be neatly framed into the Norbert Wiener’s process of receiving and using information. Thus, solving a problem of legal nature can be understood as exchanging the informative content with the outer world. The concept of legal problem and its difficulty obviously represents one of the cornerstones the whole profession is based upon. The very issue of problem difficulty (complexity) has received a lot of attention in the fields of legal theory and philosophy, the best example being Dworkin’s division of problems (cases) to the ‘standard’ and ‘hard’ cases. In computer science, and the theory of algorithms in particular, the issue of computational difficulty (or complexity) has traditionally received plenty of attention as well. The efforts have led to an elaborate classification of individual computational problems complexity and identification of certain subsets, within the complete set of problems, characterized by very specific and interesting features, especially subsets of P and NP-complete problems. Besides that, various well refined techniques of coping with ‘extremely difficult’ computational problems have been designed – e.g. the ‘divide and conquer’ method as one of the best examples. The aim of the paper is to establish a parallel between the complexity of legal and computational problems using techniques of computing coherence to bridge the wide gap between the traditional perception of a problem of legal and computational nature. The elaboration is expected to provide an insight into the complexity of legal problems within the context of computer science and to find an inspiration for effective coping with legal problems within the field that looks very distant to Law at the first glance.
MICHAŁ ARASZKIEWICZ
Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland
michal.araszkiewicz[at]uj[dot]edu[dot]pl
TITLE: Limitations of Constraints Satisfaction Theory of Coherence as a Theory of Legal Justification
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to discuss the so-called Limitation Thesis (LT) concerning constraint satisfaction theory of coherence. According to LT as advanced by Jaap Hage, constraint satisfaction theory of coherence is limited in the sense that the constraints themselves are not included in a set of justificatory propositions. After a brief clarification of several possible interpretations of LT, we try to develop an extended version of constraint satisfaction theory of coherence which would be more immune to LT than Thagard’s original version. In consequence, there is introduced the concept of level of constraints. The level-0 constraints are defined on the set of propositions. The level-1 constraints are defined on the set of level-0 constraints, and so on. The advantages and disadvantages of such amended theory are discussed in the context of the distinction between internal and external justification in legal reasoning. In particular, the amended theory shall be assessed from the perspective of (1) its computational features and (2) its soundness concerning standard theory of legal argumentation.
